Files
hermes-webui/tests/test_v050257_opus_followups.py
nesquena-hermes c78bcddda6 v0.50.257: CRITICAL Opus finding — fix non-functional per-session toolset override
Opus pre-release advisor caught a 5th issue not covered by my initial
follow-up sweep, this one CRITICAL: PR #1402 #493 per-session toolset
override silently no-op'd every time.

Bug: api/streaming.py:1755 called _session_meta.get('enabled_toolsets') on
the result of Session.load_metadata_only(). It returns a Session INSTANCE,
not a dict. .get() raised AttributeError, which the surrounding bare
except swallowed silently. The toolset chip in the UI saved correctly to
disk, but the streaming agent always ran with global toolsets.

Fix: use getattr(_session_meta, 'enabled_toolsets', None).

Two new regression tests:
- Source-level: forbid the .get() / [] dict-access shape.
- Runtime: Session.load_metadata_only must return a Session instance.

Full suite: 3604 passed, 0 failed.
2026-05-01 18:36:24 +00:00

210 lines
9.0 KiB
Python

"""Regression tests for v0.50.257 Opus pre-release follow-ups (#1402 + #1415).
The v0.50.257 batch had four findings on PR #1402:
1. MUST-FIX (security) — `api/oauth.py::_write_auth_json` used `tmp.replace()`
which preserves the temp file's umask-derived mode (commonly 0644 or 0664).
`auth.json` contains OAuth access/refresh tokens; on shared systems those
tokens landed world-readable. Fix: `tmp.chmod(0o600)` BEFORE rename.
2. SHOULD-FIX (defense-in-depth) — `_handle_cron_history` and
`_handle_cron_run_detail` accepted `job_id` as a path component without
validation. `Path() / "../escape"` does not normalize, mirroring the
rollback path-traversal vector caught in v0.50.255. Fix: regex validation
that rejects `/`, `..`, `.`.
3. SHOULD-FIX — `_handle_cron_history` parsed `offset`/`limit` via raw
`int()`, so `?offset=foo` raised `ValueError` and surfaced as a generic
500 instead of a clean 400. Also no upper bound on `limit` (DoS via
`?limit=999999999`). Fix: try/except + clamp to safe ranges.
4. NIT — also propagate the cron `job_id` validation regex to make the
pattern explicit at the parameter boundary.
PR #1415 follow-up: 8 pre-existing tests in test_issue1106 and
test_custom_provider_display_name asserted bare model IDs but #1415 changes
the named-custom-provider IDs to `@custom:NAME:model` form when active
provider differs. Tests updated to use `_strip_at_prefix` helper to keep
checking the same invariant ("does model X appear in the picker") in the
new shape.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import stat
import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
# ── 1: auth.json permission fix (chmod 0600 before rename) ───────────────────
def test_oauth_write_auth_json_uses_chmod_0600_before_rename(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""`_write_auth_json` must chmod 0600 BEFORE renaming so tokens never land
world-readable. The previous implementation used `tmp.replace()` which
preserves the temp file's umask-derived mode."""
sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO))
import api.oauth as oauth
# Point AUTH_JSON_PATH at a tmp dir
fake_path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
monkeypatch.setattr(oauth, "AUTH_JSON_PATH", fake_path)
# Set a permissive umask so default write would create 0644
old_umask = os.umask(0o022)
try:
oauth._write_auth_json({"credential_pool": {"openai-codex": []}})
finally:
os.umask(old_umask)
assert fake_path.exists(), "auth.json was not written"
mode = stat.S_IMODE(fake_path.stat().st_mode)
# The file must be chmod 0600 — owner read/write only.
assert mode == 0o600, (
f"auth.json permissions are {oct(mode)}, expected 0o600. "
f"OAuth tokens (access_token, refresh_token) live in this file. "
f"On shared systems, world-readable tokens are a real exposure."
)
def test_oauth_write_auth_json_source_calls_chmod():
"""Source-level pin: any future change to _write_auth_json that drops the
chmod call must be caught even if the runtime test above is skipped on
a filesystem that doesn't support POSIX modes."""
src = (REPO / "api" / "oauth.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert "tmp.chmod(0o600)" in src, (
"_write_auth_json must call tmp.chmod(0o600) before tmp.replace() — "
"without it, OAuth tokens land world-readable on shared systems."
)
# ── 2: cron history job_id path-traversal validation ────────────────────────
def test_cron_history_rejects_traversal_in_job_id():
"""`_handle_cron_history` and `_handle_cron_run_detail` must regex-validate
job_id at the parameter boundary. Mirrors the rollback regex shape from
v0.50.255."""
src = (REPO / "api" / "routes.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
# Both handlers must call the validator
history_idx = src.find("def _handle_cron_history(")
detail_idx = src.find("def _handle_cron_run_detail(")
assert history_idx != -1, "_handle_cron_history missing"
assert detail_idx != -1, "_handle_cron_run_detail missing"
history_body = src[history_idx : history_idx + 1500]
detail_body = src[detail_idx : detail_idx + 1500]
# Both must include the regex check
for body, name in [(history_body, "_handle_cron_history"), (detail_body, "_handle_cron_run_detail")]:
assert "_re.fullmatch" in body and "[A-Za-z0-9_-]" in body, (
f"{name} must validate job_id via regex — without this, "
f"`?job_id=../<other>` enumerates sibling directory contents."
)
assert 'job_id in (".", "..")' in body, (
f"{name} must explicitly reject `.` and `..` in addition to the regex."
)
# ── 3: int() bounds checking on offset/limit ────────────────────────────────
def test_cron_history_clamps_offset_and_limit():
"""`_handle_cron_history` must catch `ValueError` from int() and clamp
`limit` to a sane upper bound. Without this, `?offset=foo` raises a
ValueError that surfaces as a confusing 500 from `do_GET`'s exception
handler, and `?limit=999999999` would slice through unbounded glob output."""
src = (REPO / "api" / "routes.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
history_idx = src.find("def _handle_cron_history(")
body = src[history_idx : history_idx + 1500]
assert "(ValueError, TypeError)" in body, (
"_handle_cron_history must catch ValueError from int() so malformed "
"offset/limit return a clean 400, not a generic 500."
)
assert "min(500, int(qs.get" in body, (
"_handle_cron_history must clamp `limit` to a sane upper bound (500 chosen) "
"to prevent DoS via `?limit=999999999`."
)
# ── Critical Opus finding: enabled_toolsets actually applies ─────────────────
def test_run_agent_streaming_uses_session_enabled_toolsets():
"""The per-session toolset override (#493) was non-functional in PR #1402:
`Session.load_metadata_only()` returns a Session INSTANCE, but the code
called `.get('enabled_toolsets')` on it. AttributeError was swallowed by
the surrounding `except Exception`, so the user's toolset chip silently
no-op'd every time. Pin the source-level invariant so this exact regression
can't return."""
src = (REPO / "api" / "streaming.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
# The bug shape that must NOT come back: dict-style access on the result.
# Negative-pattern guard (prevents revert).
bad_pattern = "_session_meta.get('enabled_toolsets')"
assert bad_pattern not in src, (
f"streaming.py contains {bad_pattern!r} — Session.load_metadata_only() "
f"returns a Session INSTANCE, not a dict, so .get() raises AttributeError. "
f"The bare `except Exception:` swallows the failure silently and the "
f"per-session toolset override is non-functional. Use getattr() instead. "
f"(Opus pre-release advisor caught this in v0.50.257.)"
)
bad_pattern2 = "_session_meta['enabled_toolsets']"
assert bad_pattern2 not in src, (
f"streaming.py contains {bad_pattern2!r} — same bug shape. "
f"Session.load_metadata_only() returns an instance, not a dict."
)
# Positive pattern: getattr() must be used.
assert "getattr(_session_meta, 'enabled_toolsets'" in src, (
"streaming.py must use getattr(_session_meta, 'enabled_toolsets', None) "
"since load_metadata_only returns a Session instance."
)
def test_session_load_metadata_only_returns_instance_not_dict():
"""End-to-end: Session.load_metadata_only must return a Session instance,
not a dict. This is the contract that breaks PR #1402's toolset override
if a future change converts it to a dict."""
sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO))
from api.models import Session
import tempfile
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpd:
# Create a fake session file
import json as _json
sid = "test1234abcd"
from api import models
original = models.SESSION_DIR
models.SESSION_DIR = Path(tmpd)
try:
session_file = Path(tmpd) / f"{sid}.json"
session_file.write_text(_json.dumps({
"session_id": sid,
"title": "Test",
"workspace": tmpd,
"model": "test/model",
"enabled_toolsets": ["bash", "file"],
"messages": [],
"tool_calls": [],
}))
result = Session.load_metadata_only(sid)
finally:
models.SESSION_DIR = original
# Result must be a Session instance — not None and not a dict.
assert result is not None, "load_metadata_only returned None for valid session"
assert isinstance(result, Session), (
f"load_metadata_only must return Session instance, got {type(result)}"
)
# And the enabled_toolsets must be readable via getattr
assert getattr(result, 'enabled_toolsets', None) == ["bash", "file"]